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Abstract 
This paper  explores how the  state  employs digital technologies  in its 
pacification of dissident political bodies, subjectivities, and communi- 
cative capabilities. It explores strategies of resistance to the surveillance 
practices which come to the fore as a state form, as a means of social con- 
trol, and as a mechanism for creating manageable and disciplined crowds. 
Drawing upon ethnographic data, it focuses on the contemporary poli- 
tics of the Kurdish  movement  in Turkey. In particular,  it analyses the 
digitized surveillance and resistance of Kurds, both of which function as 
crucial components  of contemporary power regimes in Turkey. 
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This article explores the novel ways in which the use of digital technolo- 
gies has become a political power in Kurdish-Turkish relations. Rela- 
tions  between  the two communities  have historically been shaped  by 
two forces: On  the one hand, there is the Kurdish  insurgent  national- 
ist movement, including groups like the armed PKK (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers Party) and its urban representative the 
KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, or Group  of Communities in Kurdis- 
tan). This movement claims to fight for the cultural and political rights 
of Kurds, including the official recognition of Kurds as a unique cultural 
group  and the  free exercise of their  cultural  identity  and language in 
state institutions. On the other, there are the pacification regimes of the
 	
	
Turkish state, which regards this movement as a major threat to the ter- 
ritorial and political status quo in the region (Kirişçi, 2004; Özoğur, 2004). 
The objects and targets of the contemporary form of power employed 
against this movement are the political bodies acting and speaking for it, 
their political subjectivities, and their communicative capabilities. 
This new form of power makes use of digital technologies  in two 
paradoxical and related ways: As a state form, it captures the flow of in- 
formation, colonizing the physical and cognitive spaces of bodies in their 
daily practices and communications through  preemptive, decentralized, 
and routinized  digital surveillance. In this form, the new power feeds off 
the juridical and police systems where collected data has become evi- 
dence to support  accusations of involvement, support,  or sympathy for 
terrorism in the counterterrorism trials of thousands of Turkish citizens. 
As a form of resistance, on the other hand, such power enables the rup- 
ture of control over information networks, provoking a new language to 
emerge that both negotiates and resists the all-encompassing coloniza- 
tion of communication. Significantly, Kurdish  activists have been using 
digital technologies, and particularly  the Internet, to produce  effective 
critiques of these trials and the preemptive surveillance, and to continue 
generating  new discourses  and  representations, asserting  their  ethnic 
and political identities. While neither attempts to control the Kurds nor 
their  resistance take place only in digital spaces or through  the appli- 
cation of information technologies, these technologies have provided a 
new rationale for both state control and for Kurdish  resistance. When 
all public spaces have shrunk due to the prevalence of electronic surveil- 
lance, such technologies have created new communicative spaces. 
This study attempts to show that the Turkish state has become a tru- 
ly technological surveillant state in relation to dissident politics. While 
this tendency is not limited to the state approach to the Kurdish  move- 
ment, it is enacted  on Kurds  most  forcefully. The wider literature  on 
the new forms of power tends to focus on surveillant states in western 
societies and overlook how surveilled people negotiate and resist these 
practices in their daily lives. Therefore, this study aims to contribute to 
the literature  by discussing the ways in which the surveilled bodies, and 
particularly the Kurds, experience, manage, and resist the new forms of 
power in practice, in their daily lives, and in their political activities. 
In what follows, I will first engage some of the relevant theoretical 
literature  on modern  and postmodern forms of control and resistance, 
	
 	
	
outlining  both  the ways in which new control  regimes operationalize 
their power on surveilled bodies and the immanent  potentialities  of re- 
sistance that can arise in the forms of resisting counterpublics. I then 
briefly contextualize  the evolving political situation  within  the history 
of Kurdish-Turkish relations,  before presenting  an analysis of ethno- 
graphic  research  completed  in 2012  with  forty users of communica- 
tion technologies in different cities in Turkey. I will suggest that  tech- 
nological forms of surveillance contribute to the colonization of bodies’ 
communicative practices by inhibiting ordinary language, shrinking the 
boundary  between public and private space, and distorting  the intimate 
relationship  between users and their  digital devices and social media. 
In response to this, resistive politics aim to gain control of the means of 
communicability, particularly through  the use of social media to create 
new languages, new selves, new modes of speech, and new sites of dis- 
cussion and exchange that not only address Kurdish users but also non- 
Kurds  who are unfamiliar  with the Kurdish  reality. Finally, in the last 
part, I will sketch an outline of the contemporary authoritarian regime 
of Turkey’s technological surveillant state and the resistance politics of 
digital young Kurds. This dynamic, I will suggest, also informs the Gezi 
movement of 2013 that  has become one of the most diverse revolts of 
young people, including Kurds, in the history of Turkey. 
	
Understanding  Surveillance and Resistance in Contemporary Societies 
Recent studies on surveillance show that  there  is an intrinsic  link be- 
tween the digitization  of information,  the ubiquitous  use of informa- 
tion  technologies  by citizens/consumers, and the unprecedented level 
of recording, storing, and manipulation of information by those  with 
access to the data (Deleuze, 1992; Lyon, 2004). As bodies are immersed 
in digital spaces through the exposure and use of credit cards, electronic 
IDs, cellphones, telephones, the Internet, city cameras, and data-mining  
systems, they leave traces as they move, act and communicate  within 
the fluctuating  and flexible networks. Hence, the monitoring  facilities 
and possibilities provided by digital technologies amplify the state’s 
capability of control, giving rise to concerns about the maintenance  of 
democracy and civil rights and the rise of new forms of 
authoritarianism (see Best, 2010; Morozov, 2011). Gilles Deleuze 
defines this new form of society that  is administered and managed 
through computer- ized systems of surveillance as the “society of 
control,” in which mecha- nisms of command become ever more fluid 
and immanent  to the social field, distributed throughout
 	
	
 the bodies of citizens/consumers who are no longer individuals 
(corporeal bodies) but dividuals “consisting of modulations of coded 
information,” (Bogard, 2007) internally divided into measurable and 
adjustable pieces, or data. For Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), 
in this new social formation  that  they call “imperial society,” the 
relationship  between power and the individual is “open, qualitative and 
affective,” the social production of subjectivities is not limited to places, 
and power is everywhere and nowhere,  generating “non-places” where 
the social production of subjectivities becomes a “fluid processes of the 
generation and the corruption of subjectivity” (p. 196).  In such an 
environment, “ The indefiniteness of the place of the social production 
corresponds  to the indeterminacy  of the form of the subjectivities 
produced” (ibid).  
Technological control partakes in these subjectification processes, 
generating a simulated version of surveilled bodies; an additional  self, 
(Poster, 1990) or data double, (Haggerty and Ericson, 2007)  of pure 
virtuality, whose narrative is necessarily different from reflection of an 
original referent due to the technological mode of its representation 
(Best, 2010; Ball, 2005). The representation and re-creation  of bodies 
in scanscapes are used for a variety of tasks within increasingly dominant 
modes of management  of financial, ecological, and security risks (Lyon, 
2007).  In particular, law and technology function relationally in 
discriminating against sections of the population on the basis of (vague) 
definitions of terrorism,  regarded  as one of the greatest  threats  to 
contemporary societies. While anti-terrorism laws codify those who may 
be surveilled, the actual practice of surveillance generates evidential data 
of different versions of the lives (or crimes) of the surveilled completely 
outside their control (ibid). As Kirstie Ball (2005) suggests, surveillance is 
not only understood as information or knowledge but also as protection 
from threat. In order 
 	
	
for the state to justify the prevalence of surveillance of selected bodies, 
it also needs to maintain  both synopticism, (Mathiesen, 1997) or the 
communicative machines of fear and panic through  which viewers 
and/or spectators  are conditioned  to believe in the deadly threat  of 
terrorism  in their society, and panopticism, (Foucault, 1977) or the 
imprisonment of bodies carrying the risk of terrorism  and their exclusion 
from public spaces of action and communication (Ball, 2005: 94). Thus, 
in contemporary societies, digital surveillance enables the broadening and 
tightening of the net of regimentation around mass and individual bodies 
(Lyon, 2007: 170; Marx, 2007: 83). It therefore does not replace but rather 
consolidates existing forms of synoptic and panoptic control. 
These global trends in the increasing control of citizens/consumers 
lead to local investment in centralized civil registry systems, digitized re- 
mote listening, advanced filtering systems, data mining systems, and city 
cameras. In this way, Turkey has now become a technological surveillant 
state which makes use of all these facilities to monitor its population, 
and particularly its dissident political subjects (Arslantaş-Toktaş et al., 
2012; Topal, 2005). Importantly, Turkeys current counterterrorism laws 
are based on an extremely broad definition  of terrorists  acts, including 
non-violent,  discursive actions which criticize or demoralize the security 
forces. In fact, according to the Minister of Internal Affairs, such actions 
may even include “poetry, painting, daily columns and articles” (Reporters 
without Borders, 2012). This enables the pervasive and manipulative surveillance 
of all dissident groups, resulting in thousands of people being put in prison 
and on trial as terrorist suspects. Technology plays an important role in 
gathering suspicious documents or conversations as such technological 
evidence creates the perception of precision, valid- ity, and reliability in 
the eyes of the public. Moreover, technologies are represented  as truth 
production machines as they become evidence in counterterrorism trials 
and the source of discrediting  messages about political subjects in media 
coverage. The pressure and lack of autonomy that  journalists  face in the 
contemporary mediascape   as well as the 
	
 	
crisis of the juridical system in terms of providing the basis for justice 
contribute to the operations  of the new pacification regime that  aims 
to “tame the social, political and economic forces” (Masoud, 2011 cited in Tüfekçi 
and Wilson, 2012)  in seemingly democratic but essentially authoritarian ways. 
My analysis of this new form of power is based on Michel Foucault’s 
(1977) argument  that possibilities of resistance are immanent  within 
forms of power.  If there is no place outside  regimes of control, as Hardt 
and Negri (2000) argue, we should look for modes of resistance in all 
non-places. The digital technoscape is a non-place where one is subjected, 
willingly or not, to fluid regimes of control and subjectification. Yet, such 
fluidity not only contributes to forms of control but also to the 
interruption of control  through  the creation  of a spatio-temporal gap 
between the surveilled and surveillor and the anonymity  of users who 
actively partake in meaning from within  the flexible and fluctuating  
networks  of digitized power.  Disruption of control of a limited duration  
and scope only carries the potential  of resistance if the meaning-making  
process differs from the dominant ways of addressing individuals or the 
public. Digital communication technologies have no force separate from 
the social systems through  which discourses and meanings are produced  
and shared across different social groups over the network  at high speed 
(Stone, 1996).  
	
	 Interpellation into the usership of the net (and thereby consent 
to be- ing surveilled) is based on the promise that an ordinary individual 
may become an active produser (producer and user, see Grinnel, 2009) of 
the self, language, and textual representation in the virtual presence of 
others in ways impossible in face-to-face relations. Although there is 
always an original referent to all virtual bodies on these platforms, each 
and every user that is present on the web of virtual relations  and spaces 
is recreated  in artificiality. The artificiality that  is produced  in the 
performative  uses of the net within  the work/ play of self-design (Groys, 
2008)  reveals both  the limitations  and potentialities  of self-creation; 
limitations  such as the digital divide, and the hierarchies that subsist 
between races, ethnicities, gender within the virtual spaces, and 
potentialities  such as the renewal of speech and diction to create, 
recreate, and present  the self that  one finds in virtual social relations. 
As Hardt and Negri (2000) write, “Once we see ourselves for the simians 
and cyborgs we are,” we must participate in “the continuous  constituent 
pro- ject to create and re-create ourselves and our world” in the domain  
of artificiality (p. 92). 
 	
	 	
This creation  and re-creation  of selves and worlds that  we inhabit 
within the digital technoscape can be best understood with Michael 
Warner’s (2002)  concept  of counterpublics.  For  Warner, “counterpublics  
are publics,” produced  through  circulatory discourses, addressing diverse 
people, including strangers, hailing them into particular positions, “pro- 
viding a sense of active belonging that  masks or compensates  the real 
powerlessness  of human  agents  in capitalist  society” (p. 81).  On the  other 
hand, the difference of counterpublic discourse is that  it “remains distinct 
from the authorities” and has a “critical relation  to power” ( Sheridan et al., 
2012: 101).  The counterpublic does not conflict with power simply because 
it comes to the fore as a reflection of subculture  or oppositional  identities  
formed elsewhere, but precisely as the re-creation  of languages, 
discourses, and subjectivities that challenge the dominant groups, ideas, 
and policies, as well as the speech genres and modes of address, that 
constitute  the pub- lic. The potentialities  of counterpublics are always 
immanent  in public organizations  that  have the necessary tensions, 
perversities, and ambiguities to function continuously. 
Functioning  as a container  for millions of users, (see Sofia, 2000 for the 
conceptualization of container technologies)  the Internet becomes a social 
laboratory  in which users can interact  with each other through  their 
representations and improvise circulatory discourses. Among Kurds  
searching for means of communicability  and new ways of expressing or 
recreating themselves through  a novel language and discourse that degrades 
power, disciplinary institutions, and the dominant political culture, such 
possibilities of the Internet contribute to the formation  of a counterpublic. 
The Kurdish  counterpublic is not solely instituted through online 
discourses; it has intertextual relations with all critiques of state 
authoritarianism, media synopticism, power relations, and dominant 
discourses that aim to create defeated, accepting, and docile 
consumers/citizens out of the Kurdish  population. 
 
The Kurds of Turkey 
 
Kurds  constitute  the largest nation  in the world without  a state, and they 
struggle for their  cultural  and political rights  in countries  where they reside. 
The Kurds  of Turkey have been in ongoing revolt against the political project 
of the Turkish Republic, which aimed to develop a nationhood based on the 
Turkish language and an imagined national identity that required a break 
with religiosity, local traditions,  and non- Turkic ethnic  identities (Yeğen, 
1999; Özoğur, 2004).  At first, Kurdish  resistance against this establishment 
had the characteristics  of local armed nationalist  and religious rebellions, but 
later gained the traits  of a wider, modern,  leftist, pacifist nationalist  
movement in the 1960s and 1970s (Kirişçi, 2004).  With the rise of the armed 
movement of the PKK in the early 1980s, ethnic and cultural consciousness 
grew and spread amongst almost all Kurds living in Turkey (ibid). Violence 
 	
and human  rights violations against Kurds  during the military dictatorship 
of 1980-83, prohibition of the use of Kurdish both  in private and public 
spaces, and the clearance of villages in the south  eastern parts of Turkey 
under  the State  of Emergency Rules of the 1990s  provoked  many Kurds  to 
become involved in activism and even join the armed struggle (Gambetti, 2009: 
45).  
For millions of politically active Kurds, the use of media technologies has 
become of crucial significance, signifying the possibility of deciphering human 
rights violations against Kurds, re-inventing themselves in a desired form, and 
producing a sense of nation in the absence an officially recognized Kurdish  
territory.  After the newspaper Özgür Gündem and the satellite TV-channel 
MedTV were established in the 1990s, they became extremely popular in 
Kurdish  populated  areas, and were conse- quently treated as engines of 
terrorist propaganda  by the state; journal- ists were killed, readers/viewers 
were arrested or exposed to the violence of security forces (see Hassanpour, 
1998; Gambetti, 2009). After these bloody years, a relatively freer environ- 
ment was established due to both the capture of the PKK leader in 1999 and 
the democratization processes adopted as a result of Turkey’s aspiration to 
become a member of EU in the early 2000s.  These changes did not put an 
end to the war between the PKK and Turkish army, but permitted the  
representation of Kurdish  voters in municipalities  and the Parliament with 
a distinct  political party, and, to a certain extent, the presence of Kurds  in 
media and creative industries. 
The Kurdish diaspora has employed desktop and electronic 
publishing to develop a standardized Kurdish  as well as an archive of 
extensive literature,  both of which aim to produce  a sense of belonging 
to a culture, literature, and history (Romano, 2002; Ayata, 2011). 
Likewise, Kurdish  cinema and music became a means for Kurds  to assert 
their  cultural  and ethnic  identity  more strongly than ever through  digital 
media. 
In this relatively freer environment,  the government initiated the “Kurdish 
opening” in 2009, based on a political understanding of giv- ing “individual 
cultural rights to Kurds,” including permitting  the home- coming of PKK  
militants,  opening  of Kurdish  language courses, and establishment  of  a  
state-run  Kurdish-language television  channel (Yeğen, 2013). 
However, these developments have instigated national hysteria, with the 
Turkish public feeling it had conceded “enough already” (ibid).  Meanwhile, 
politicized  Kurds  remain  dissatisfied and continue  to demand  a neutral 
definition of citizenship that would not exclude their ethnicity and guarantees 
of the free exercise of Kurdish  identity, including the use of their mother 
tongue for education and legislation. 
Particularly  after 2011, as the uprisings in the Arab World were 
spreading  to  different  countries  across the  Middle  East, the  Turkish 
state reverted  its strategy from providing individual cultural  rights  to a 
hard-line  approach  whose aim seemed to be to “finish off the PKK,” 
 	
cutting  the organic links between the Kurdish  masses, the PKK,  and 
the pro-Kurdish political party (BDP).  While  this new tactic included 
traditional  military operations  against PKK  militants, it focused more 
on the judiciary and police system, which tried thousands of people un- 
der anti-terror legislation, as well as on the propaganda machine and the 
media, which attempted to discredit the politicians of the BDP. As a 
consequence of this new political strategy, more than  twelve thousand 
people, including Kurdish politicians, journalists, students, doctors, and 
even mayors, are on trial accused of aiding, abetting, or being a member 
of the KCK. The evidence in these trials mostly consists of data collect- 
ed through  digital surveillance methods. This research takes up the ef- 
fects of policies regarding KCK cases and the pacification regime of the 
state towards the Kurdish population between 2009 and 2012. In 2013, 
the Turkish state  once again adopted  a relatively moderate  approach, 
launching an apparent “peace process” to attempt to resolve the Kurdish 
conflict with constitutional reforms after an agreement with the PKK 
leader that  PKK  guerrillas withdraw  from Turkish territory.  However in 
2014, the political climate has radically changed once more into which the 
peace process is fundamentally threatened by the clashes between the Turkish 
security forces and the political Kurds demonstrating against the inactivity of 
Turkish government with regards to the ISIS invasion of Kobane (the Kurdish  
area in the northern Syria).  
 
 
The data 
The data is derived from in-depth  interviews conducted  in 2012 with 
forty users of communication technologies, including telephones,  
cellphones,  or the  Internet, in İstanbul  (17), Diyarbakır  (9), Ankara  
(2) and Mardin  (4). The sample focused on middle class Turkish (5) 
and Kurdish  users, between 18 and 65 years of age, including digital 
activ- ists (mostly  18-40),  university students,  lawyers, teachers, 
intelligence officers, NGO workers, and the unemployed. The reason for 
the inclu- sion of Turkish users in the sample is to understand the 
comparative effect of technological surveillance on Kurdish subjects at a 
comparative level where the generalized surveillance also affects others. 
The sample focused largely on the middle class, because particularly 
Kurdish  users of personal digital communication technologies and social 
networks tended to be middle class. The sample included twenty men and 
twenty women. 
The in-depth   interviews,  which  lasted  an  average of  one-to-two 
hours, asked whether  interviewees felt that  they were being surveilled, 
how they reacted to such surveillance practices, and how they negotiated 
and/or resisted these forms of control. While some Turkish informants 
seemed to be less interested  in politics, all my self-defined Kurdish  in- 
 	
terviewees were politically conscious subjects. Indeed, defining oneself 
as a Kurd  is already a political statement in the political landscape of 
Turkey. Regardless of their level of involvement with a political party or 
organization, all informants  were well aware of the current  surveillance 
practices of the state. Most  of them  expressed concern that  they were 
potentially/actually under  surveillance and  irritation at  the  infringe- 
ment of their privacy. And yet, when the issue came down to the per- 
ceived risk of being under constant  surveillance, there seemed to be dif- 
ferences between politically active informants  and others, and between 
Kurds and Turks. 
All digital  activist interviewees  use smart  phones  with  a connec- tion to 
the Internet—by now ubiquitous  gadgets among different social classes in 
Turkey. All of them were regular users of Facebook (the most visited page in 
Turkey)42  and  some of them  were also Twitter users. Those respondents 
experienced in virtual politics participated  in forum discussions and 
contributed to urban-dictionaries and open blogs, and were truly members 
of the user publics of the digital ecologies. Those residing in Istanbul and 
Ankara had more heterogeneous  crowds of vir- tual friendship  networks  that  
did not require offline acquaintances  or kinship, and all of their personal 
messages became public as they wrote in their personal pages or open/closed 
Facebook groups, Twitter hash- tags, and blogs. As the centralized 
technological surveillance of the state tends to use telephone conversations, 
texting and email exchanges to record conversations  or find/fabricate images 
as evidence, most of the users interviewed preferred to use social media sites 
like Facebook and Twitter for their  cultural  and political communications, 
as such sites have policies requiring the Turkish state to officially apply to 
access us- ers’ private information.  Despite Facebook being regarded as less 
trust- worthy in this sense due to certain groups being closed by the company 
after complaints  by other  users, it remains the most popular  platform, 
providing users access to bigger and more heterogeneous  crowds.
 	
 	
 	
The production of control and its effects 
Turkey’s surveillance regime is not a new phenomenon. The novelty lies 
in the growth  of technological authoritarianism that  amalgamates the 
forces of law, the police, and technology to produce digital materials that 
can be easily manipulated to generate fake conversations, fabricated im- 
ages, and misleading narratives of crimes when there exists no rational 
way to prove the crime. Although  one cannot  argue that  all evidence 
presented  in the indictments of anti-terror trials is based on the tech- 
nological mutation of non-evidence of crimes, lawyers, human rights as- 
sociations, and civil right activists have concrete concerns about the way 
technological control functions  to manufacture  crime. One lawyer of a 
KCK case in Diyarbakır explains his experiences in such trials: 
	
The indictments start with hundreds of pages of KCK history, con- 
tinue  with few testimonials  of hidden  witnesses, followed by hun- 
dreds of pages of transcriptions obtained  by remote listening, tran- 
scriptions of wiretaps, text messages, and so on. All of these are read 
out in court. So the private lives of all these suspects are heard  by 
everyone […] The court becomes like a gossip show […] since none 
of this information can be used to prove a crime on a rational basis, 
the prosecutors  claim that they are encrypted messages. 
	
There are many  examples of such “evidence”  in the  indictments:  An 
SMS  message reading “37 B Black,” sent from a suspect to her sister, 
asking her to buy a bra in this size and color, was interpreted by the 
prosecutor  as code for a bomb. A telephone conversation during which 
a Turkish professor is invited to a meeting by another KCK suspect and 
responds “inshallah,” interpreted as the conscious admission of partici- 
pating in the terrorist organizations’ meetings. A police photograph of 
 	
	
an illiterate old Kurdish  woman at a protest  in Diyarbakır  was claimed 
to be evidence that  she was a KCK  organizer, responsible  for inviting 
protestors to the violent protest  by email. Despite  the fact that  almost 
half of the wiretappings  are in Kurdish,  and have to be translated  into 
Turkish to serve as evidence, these terror trials are often blocked by the 
denial of Kurdish  suspects requests to testify in Kurdish. In the face of 
such evidence, suspects’ lawyers often express feelings of desperation. As 
one lawyer in Diyarbakır  said, “I do not know how to defend them,” or, 
as another from Mardin expressed it; “I feel as if I was given a role to play 
in an absurd comedy; a sort of deadly joke.” 
The effect of surveillance on the surveilled bodies becomes pressing, 
as people feel the constant pressure of being relentlessly watched in their 
daily activities and communications. A female municipal worker, on trial 
without detention accused of helping the KCK without being a member, 
explains this effect: 
	
When you are taken into custody, they put on the table all the infor- 
mation  they have collected over time without  your knowledge [...] 
It’s terrifying to see. I mean, it’s as if I was always naked. And the way 
they present all these things in indictments!  All the pieces are sewn 
together to create another you. The data is yours, but the story is not. 
What is most terrifying is not my possible detention or imprison- 
ment, but to see how they control everything, every minute  of your 
life, and manipulate everything in the way they want. 
	
Likewise, most of my Kurdish  interviewees, whether on trial or not, de- 
scribe their fear of the amalgamated forces of law and technology not as 
one of confinement  in prison on the basis of evidence whose collection 
and interpretation seem outside their control, but of being relentlessly 
watched every moment  of their lives. While  Kurds  certainly remain at 
the top of the Turkish state’s hierarchy of risky subjects and categories of 
suspicion, the consciousness of surveillance is not limited to them, but 
has also spread to the Turkish activists that I interviewed. As one well- 
known  female activist from Istanbul  noted, “ We  definitely come after 
Kurds  in the state’s list of usual suspects.” Nevertheless,  amalgamated 
force of law and technology seems to inspire a more pressing fear of im- 
prisonment on the part of politicized non-Kurds than on Kurds them- 
selves. Perhaps this because, as one doctoral student expressed it, “If you 
define yourself as a Kurd in this society and if you decide to struggle for 
your identity and language, you must be ready for imprisonment, death, 
and the loss of your future [...] It is a high-cost struggle.” 
 	
As one of the risks of technological surveillance for a surveilled body 
is the rewriting of its biography as a crime story, one of the ways peo- 
ple attempt to manage the experience is the production of a new daily 
language, addressing an unknown  listener as well as the known receiver. 
This particularly  affects conversations  on the telephone,  as telephone 
systems (mobile or wired) constitute  what one former intelligence ser- 
vice agent described as the “main artery of the surveillance systems.” The 
potential eavesdropper is always present, altering the very nature of daily 
language and distorting  it into artificial forms. A journalist working for 
a pro-Kurdish news agency in Diyarbakır  explained how consciousness 
of surveillance affects his daily communications: 
	
All conversations are prolonged and became explanatory, even when 
it is not needed. I don’t speak on the phone as I used to any more. I 
give full explanations  about  everything that  I speak about  on the 
phone. Not  because the other  does not get what I’m talking about, 
but to minimize the risk of manipulation of what I say by the con- 
stant guests on our line. 
	
Thus, the amalgamation of the legal apparatus  and technological intru- 
sion generates collective desperation  due to a felt loss of control  over 
communication and meaning. 
Ordinary language is not  only instrumental and practical but  also 
performative in the sense that nuances of meaning are captured and de- 
termined  in the context  of speech and diction. Thus, the amputation 
of language brings forth the felt loss of possibilities of language games, 
jokes, humor,  irony and gossip, which make ordinary  speech and daily 
conversation a dwelling place for human interaction (Wittgenstein, 2009). 
A primary school teacher in Diyarbakır  tells me that he “cannot even 
gossip because, you know, all conversations are being read in courts. I 
mean the problem is not only that  you have no privacy, no secrets any 
more, but also your relationships  can be troubled.” Technological 
representation thus  has the potential  to make the private public, and 
the coherent  incoherent, or the innocent  conversation a vehicle of other 
meanings in unpredict- able ways. The boundaries between private and 
public that prevent each invading the other evaporate. 
In addition  to the extra care they adopt in their daily speech on the 
phone or in particular places where they are sure of surveillance, most of 
my informants  routinely clear the digital files in their computers, email 
 	
	
inboxes, CDs  and flash-disks, so as not to leave any material  for sur- 
veillance regimes to manipulate. This, however, changes the very nature 
of the relationship  between users and their  machines, which are now 
means to control of communicability  both by their users and the state. 
One female informant  described this feeling: 
	
My computer  and my cellphone used to feel like the extensions of my 
body. Now I feel like there is someone else between my things and my- 
self. I don’t want to keep anything in my computer or my cell phone. 
	
I have elsewhere explored  the  ways in which  people  in Turkey have 
grown attached  to their  digital devices, not only due to the machines’ 
instrumental and display value, but also due to the seemingly liberating 
effects they can produce. In Turkey, users can employ these technologies 
to do things they normally cannot in in their daily lives and in existing 
social constraints.  On the one hand, digital technologies enabled them 
to create a private world outside the monitoring  of familial authority;  a 
world where a desired self-design could be saved, deleted, or edited for 
user publics (Çelik, 2011) On the other, for the user counterpublic of 
Kurds, these technologies also allowed political mobilization  for political 
protest through  de-centralized text messages, or the dutiful and playful 
exercise of unfamiliar  mother  Kurdish  language through  texting among 
peers. Turkish-speaking public spaces were also transformed into 
Kurdish- speaking soundscapes through  the ringtones of cellphones 
(Çelik, 2012). 
Thus, the imposition  of this new form of control on surveilled bod- 
ies who are conscious of their surveillance contributes to incommunica- 
bility in various ways. The main operations  of this new form of power 
are the amputation of daily language, the shrinking of all public spaces 
of communication, and the distortion of the relationship  between hu- 
man beings and the machines that are both in the service of neo-liberal 
and authoritarian technological power yet also allow critical discourses, 
language, and counterpublics to form resistive potentialities.  However, 
when the means of protecting  oneself from this sort of power or of ex- 
pressing oneself in any language inside or outside institutions or non- 
places seem to be lost, the motivation to use all non-places for resistance 
might increase. While  Kurdish  inmates started  a hunger strike lasting
 	
approximately 70 days to demand Kurdish language rights in courts and 
education, and an end to the denial of the imprisoned PKK leader‘s right 
to communicate  with  his lawyers, the younger digital political bodies 
outside prisons continued  their struggle, particularly to gain the means 
of communicability in digital spaces as well as in streets. 
	
The production of the political in digital counterpublics 
 
The recognition  of limitations  and inequalities that  subsist in the vir- 
tual world and the potentialities  that  are immanent  in the artificiality 
(the virtual self-design) of this non-place  contribute to the “produser- 
ship” of activists. During  the Arab  Spring, activists  made good use of 
digital communication technologies to organize prepare the ground for 
collective action against authoritarian state power, especially in Egypt 
through  the forums, blogs and social media. Seeing this, Kurdish  ac- 
tivists now seem to be more motivated  to believe in the power of the 
Internet to effectively alter the political culture. Since the most press- 
ing effect of the contemporary regimes of control  is upon  political in- 
dividuals’ communicative capabilities, the Internet becomes a means of 
creating a resistive possibility. In the hands of Kurdish  users, including 
the Kurdish  politicians, it has enabled the production of new and al- 
ternative communication platforms where political users ideally do not 
only voice their critiques, concerns, and demands, but also produce their 
own counterpublics,  textual representations, and discourses to change 
the political and social landscape in which they live. A male activist in 
Diyarbakır  recounts  how he decided to start using digital technologies 
in his political struggle: 
	
Ninety  percent  of Kurds  write [on the net] with another  persona, 
using proxies and so on. We know that we are not free in the virtual 
world either. We know that we are considered a threat. This is some- 
thing transferred from the real world. It is like the political conscious- 
ness to desire not to decipher one’s identity. It is the outcome of po- 
litical reality, not fear. I have always been a regular user [...] I created 
characters  for myself. So I thought,  if I can create a character  that 
becomes very popular on the net, I can do many other things there. 
This is how I did it, how I started using it for my own purposes. 
	
Particularly against the existing forms of information monopoly and 
media synopticism, Kurds  appropriate the virtual space to make their 
own news and share it with a larger public, preferably containing those 
unfamiliar with the Kurdish  reality. 
 	
	
News networks 
 
News is central to the making of political culture in Turkey. As well as 
independent, pro-Kurdish, professional online news agencies such as 
ANF  and DİHA, and web TV such as Nurce  and IMC TV, there are 
many amateur news agencies, blogs, and social media. These are adopted 
by political activists to create an alternative news space that aims to have 
an effect on people’s agenda and their decision making. For instance, the 
Uludere/Roboski case did not get coverage in mass media for some ten 
hours after the massacre due to the governmental pressure on media- scape. 
It was first announced  in the pro-Kurdish news agencies, then spread  
to the  social media (twitter  and Facebook),  and thousands of people 
were called for demonstrations against the massacre via de- centralized 
messages on the Internet. Most informants  spoke about the resistive 
power of the Internet in terms of mobilizing collective action with 
reference to the protests  against Uludere  that were largely organ- ized 
through  social media messages. One male university student  from 
Istanbul commented  on this: 
	
We  see how crucial these sites are for us in the Roboski  example. 
People can only react to what is being done to us if they are informed 
about the truth.  Roboski is not the first massacre of civil Kurds, but 
it is the first one that  many people became aware of, thanks  to the 
Internet. 
	
In the hands of Kurds, the Internet is also appropriated to build com- 
munities  and to mobilize people for collective action whose targets ex- 
ceed the organization  of flash or political mobs. For instance, while the 
hunger strike of imprisoned Kurds did not find any coverage in the me- 
dia or support  from the wider public in the Turkish political landscape, 
some  Kurdish  netizens  opened  an  account  in Facebook  called Açlık 
Postası or The Hunger Post, which then turned  into Ötekilerin Postası, 
or The Others’ Post,  a social network  group  active both  in Facebook 
and Twitter. The groups aimed to make news, increase awareness about 
the strike, and support  the strikers. The founder  of Ötekilerin Postası 
explains how they decided to create their Facebook group: 
	
What the government  has been doing is to silence all others. The 
mainstream media were contributing to this aim. We asked ourselves, 
why don’t we create our own news network? Then, we began doing 
citizen journalism [on social networks]. We  wanted to make objec- 
tive news about the medical conditions of inmates that were on hunger
 	
strikes to inform their  families and the larger public. We  knew that there 
would be pressure from the state, but we have nevertheless continued. 
	
As the founder of the network says, Açlık Postası became, unexpectedly, 
one of the most popular  alternative news groups in a very short  time. 
Through the virtual community  of followers and contributors, they or- 
ganized a campaign calling on people to withdraw  money from their 
bank account and write “do not remain silent about the strikes” and put 
the money into ATM machines  to make others  engage with  the dis- 
courses written on the banknotes. Along with this campaign, political 
netizens continued publishing photos of the strikers with provocative 
messages claiming to decipher the strikes and opening discussion sites 
to mobilize people to become supporters of the struggle of the strik- 
ers. In the end, when the strike became an undeniable  issue in the po- 
litical landscape, the government took action to communicate  with the 
leader of PKK to make him stop the strike. The strike ended, and talks 
between the state and the PKK  leader eventually restarted  in January 
2013. The group then relaunched as Ötekilerin Postası and continues to 
be followed by thousands of users, including not only Kurds but all oth- 
ers who have lost their  trust  in the mainstream  media.  Neither the 
Uludere  protests  nor the campaigns supporting  the hunger  strike are 
mere outcomes  of a particular  use of the Internet. However, these ex- 
amples show how the  virtual and the  actual circulate and affect each 
other in the insurgent politics of Kurds and also others, especially when 
the state attempts to silence their voices, representations, language, and 
discursive practices through  digital surveillance, media synopticism, and 
juridicial operations. 
	
Resistance as a new form discourse: the “modern Kurdi perspective” 
 
Kurdish  users, and particularly  the younger ones, also aim to present 
and develop a “modern Kurdi  perspective,” as some of my informants 
have put it, by way of the Internet. This perspective refers to a search 
for a new political subjectivity, discourse, and language that differs from 
traditional  Kurdish  discourse, while not breaking continuity  with his- 
torical claims for cultural  and political rights. As examples of political 
intervention that makes use of the net for modern Kurdi perspective, the 
 	
	
collective called Kurd 2.0 controls different personas on social media (in- 
cluding Özgür Amed in Facebook, Özgür Gündem and bijwenist-Kurd 
2.2  in Facebook and Twitter), urban-dictionaries (such as Tolaz), and 
amateur  news agencies (such as Amed Ajans), as well as blogs/sites/e- 
journals  (including  Kurd  2.0). The founder  of the  collective explains 
their understanding of “new language” and “new discourse”: 
	
The typical Kurdish  discourse was based on the language of the vic- 
tim. We, Kurds, had tried to show that we existed in the first place, 
then we tried to show that  we were dying. But there is no need for 
this. They already know what they did to us. It is crystal clear. What 
we need is real resistance. We  need a new language to express our- 
selves. I perceive humor, irony, and sarcasm as the most effective tools 
of resistance to throw the fireball back to the ones who threw it at us. 
This is what Kurd 2.0 is about, as far as I am concerned. 
	
Internet 2.0 here provides a new rationale for the social imagining of a 
new political subjectivity with its own discourse and language. Through 
such subjectivity, potentially all Kurdish users can become the producers 
of discourses to represent  themselves in ways that  challenge the typi- 
cal representations of Kurds  as a victimized group. Furthermore, this 
Kurdish digital activist defines Turkish as “a virus” or disease of Kurdish 
political subjectivity. Turkish operates  not only as a language that  the 
state  obliges all citizens to speak, write, and receive schooling in, but 
also as a discourse which has affected the ways in which Kurds  speak 
about  themselves and represent  their  political subjectivity and claims, 
both in public and private spaces, and in both Kurdish and Turkish. The 
search for a new language and new perspective, which suggests a new 
political subjectivity that  is framed as Kurd  2.0, is thus also a struggle 
to transgress  the dominance  of Turkish as a discourse (not  merely as 
a language of everyday life and institutional practice). This dominance 
defines Kurdish  language as a non-language, and imprisons  the Kurds 
themselves in a discourse of backwardness, feudality, terrorism,  armed 
rebellion, and provinciality, in which they must sacrifice their lives for 
the  struggle of their  cultural  and ethnic  identity.  The mode  of inter- 
action and address, the form of the language of virtual exchange and 
discussion, and the particular brevity required in Facebook and Twitter 
that allows humor, laughter, and abusive messages to become easily viral 
	
 	
	
and effective all contributes to the conceptualization of Kurd  2.0. This 
new political subjectivity thus proposes not only a new language but also 
a joy in political action. 
A writer for Tolaz, a humorous Kurdi news network that is connect- 
ed to the counterpublic of Kurd 2.0, expressed this as follows: 
	
I was raised in a politically conscious family. But I was also assimi- 
lated, and cannot really read or speak in Kurdish. Living in Istanbul, I 
felt isolated from political discussions. The Internet has become a 
place for me to meet other  Kurds.  I was writing for the forums, 
dictionaries like Zıtferheng. Then I came across the Kurd 2.0 [...] 2.0 
means a lot to us. It is a new perspective, something more integrated 
into contemporary times. We speak about films, arts, and also poli- 
tics. We  believe that  the language of politics needs to be lightened. 
We need to entertain  ourselves as well. Politics should be joyful. The 
serious guys who are old and respected (kelli felli) are, like, boring. I 
respect them but I cannot really listen to them for so long [...] The 
use of humor  mobilizes our target group as well. We criticize every- 
thing—KCK cases, T.C. [Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, the Turkish Repub- 
lic] and Kurdish  politics—but in our humorous way, which is more 
critical and effective in our opinion. 
	
The Kurd  2.0 collective thus  opens like a counterpublic that  reaches 
both  Kurdish  and non-Kurdish users, particularly  in social networks 
like Facebook and Twitter, addressing all with a critique posed against 
not only the dominant Turkish political culture  that  associates Kurd- 
ishness with threats  to the unity of the country  but also the dogmatic 
historical Kurdish politics that always asks the young agents to “sacrifice 
their life, love, and future,” as one young female informant  expressed it. 
The desire to elaborate textual strategies of selfhood that  initiate  new 
signs of identity  and create innovative sites of collaboration,  negotia- 
tion, and contestation is common  to all politically aware users of the 
net, regardless of their links to the Kurd  2.0 collective. The “light” and 
sarcastic language and the joyful mode of address is not less political in 
their  eyes, but  is rather  the most effective one. One  PhD  student  ex- 
plained that it was his encounters with the “white-democrat Turk” while 
writing in Ekşisözlük (a popular  urban dictionary site) that made him 
“search for new means of argumentation to challenge their memorized 
discourses about  the Kurdish  movement.” In doing so, he explains, “I 
also began to acknowledge that the way we make our language and de- 
fine ourselves have to change.” The encounter  with others in the flow of 
 	
	
messages within the social laboratory of the net, Kurds and non-Kurds 
alike, motivate and provoke users to shatter  the dichotomous thinking 
of many people in Turkey. This destabilizes fixed political identities such 
as Turk/Kurd, terrorist/pacifist, modern Turks/traditional Kurds have 
distinct languages, discourses, and terminologies which rely on remain- 
ing explanatory, serious, and exclusive. 
For instance, one female law student from İstanbul said that she puts 
images of female guerrillas on her Facebook wall where she enjoys the 
“shock” of her Turkish Facebook friends and shows them the “absurdi- 
ties of seeing the ones on the mountains as monsters.” While most of the 
young female activists appreciate the Kurdish  movement for its struggle 
to liberate the Kurdish  women from traditional  patriarchal norms, they 
also criticize the authoritarianism of the movement and of the dominant 
Kurdish  culture, with its greater pressure on unprivileged gender posi- 
tions. A medical student  in Istanbul explained: 
	
I am Zaza. A Woman. A believer. And I will not deny that I have had 
sympathy for both the cemaat [The Fethullah Movement] and for the 
party [PKK]  at different times of my life [...] But, however I define 
myself, I am told what I have to do. I am really fed up with this. I just 
want to be a human being who has a conscience. 
	
She says her Facebook wall and her posts in various different digital com- 
munities  always intend  to “surprise” the ones who cling to fixed identi- 
ties, excluding what remains outside. At times, then, the self-creations of 
users in the social laboratory of virtual communities  become an expres- 
sion of the multitude or of the multiplicity that resists the commands of 
power regimes to homogenization and standardization. 
In a similar vein, a transsexual woman living in Diyarbakır who creat- 
ed a Kurdish Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) network 
(Hebun) on Facebook and built a community  out of silenced Kurdish 
LBGTs living in different areas in Turkey, explained: 
	
We are struggling for our ethnic identities and also our sexual identi- 
ties [...] We’re struggling against the Turkish nationalists  who deny 
the rights of Kurds and macho Kurds who deny the rights of LGBTs 
and also bourgeois Turkish LBGTs who always speak in terms and 
concepts that ordinary people don’t understand. 
	
Or from totally different perspective, one nationalist conservative activ- 
ist (IBH) became popular in the offline Kurdish political landscape after 
 	
	
his presence attracted  thousands of followers in Facebook. He is also 
involved in polemical discussions with Kurd 2.0. As he explained: 
	
We need a theoretical, intellectual basis for our movement founded 
upon our history. My followers and I are having intellectual discus- 
sions about ourselves and our identity. We  should be able to define 
ourselves through  our self-determination as a nation, but this should 
not  be exclusive of our religious identities,  nor of our history  and 
traditions. 
	
The digital counterpublics formed  by these Kurds  aim to reach both 
Kurdish political agents and others to re-form themselves and their 
languages through  exchange and discussion. They are attempts to chal- 
lenge the dominant culture  and power—be  it state power, the official 
discourse of the Turkish authorities as internalized  by Turkish nation- 
alists, PKK  doctrines, or patriarchal  language that  consigns women or 
alternative sexual identities to unprivileged positions. As one male user 
from Diyarbakır said: 
	
All of us are searching for a Kurdi perspective, Kurdi discourse, Kur- 
di language in everything we say [...] It’s like we’re integrated into the 
contemporary era, but we are not assimilated [...] We  even criticize 
some notions and approaches of the movement, but not with the lan- 
guage of T.C. or the state. 
	
In this regard, these digital communities  attempt to generate a mod- 
ern Kurdi  perspective as a discursive event. While  this  perspective is 
always already related to the political and ethnic struggle being carried 
out through  armed struggle and parliamentary  participation, it is also 
radically different  from them  in the way it operates. A modern  Kurdi 
perspective seek to produce an ever new language and discourse, accom- 
modate laughter and joy, be fluid and inclusive of all oppositional  sub- 
ject positions, remain critical of any form of authority,  and articulate a 
distinctive design and aesthetics in the digital mediascape and creative/ 
cultural industries.  In other  words, they are striving to produce  a new 
means and mode of “the political” as state power adopts new pacification 
regimes to tame their communicative and cognitive capacities. 
While  informants  did not consider digital activism a form of politi- 
cal action able to bring “revolution” to the region by itself, all of them 
considered the discursive potentialities  of the Internet to be significant. 
As Radikal Öğretmen (his Facebook persona) put it, the Internet is “one 
 	
	
of the essential sites of contemporary political movements  that  aim to 
mobilize young people.” Or again, as a cafe co-owner in Diyarbakır in his 
late 20s stated, digital activism is “something that shows that technolo- 
gies are not only in the service of the state, but also that of the people.” 
	
Conclusion 
This research has attempted to explore both forms of control by Turk- 
ish state  resistance  to them  by Kurds  that  make use of digital infor- 
mation  technologies. Over  the  last couple of years, not  only Kurdish 
political subjects but  also other  dissident  agents of Turkey have been 
feeling increased pressure  of freedom  of information and speech. For 
Kurds, the amalgamation  of the forces of law and technology on their 
bodies, strengthened by mass-media  representations, have amputated 
the  possibilities  of  ordinary  language, representation, and  discourse. 
Post-structuralist theories  in particular  inform  us that  it is language 
that initiates subjectivity. Through attempts to destroy the possibilities 
of language—historically  on the mother  language itself and currently 
on modes of expression in all languages the Kurds and their surveillors 
use—the state attempts to colonize Kurds political bodies, their subjec- 
tivities, and their communicative capabilities. 
I consider the digital activism of Kurds as an attempt to regain agen- 
cy in meaning production, retrieve the political body, and reconstruct 
language as a means of speech and discourse through  which they can 
represent themselves and their self-presence. As most of my informants 
underlined  repeatedly, Internet activism is only relevant until someone 
pulls the plug. Yet, until that moment, it functions as a space for commu- 
nicative possibilities that might have an impact on real life. The Kurds, 
for whom  both  public and private spaces of speech and diction  have 
shrunk  due to the prevalent surveillance, have created a counterpublic 
through  which they reach out to others  and recreate themselves in ex- 
change and discussion in the virtual, non-space of the net. The political 
Kurds,  particularly  young ones, appropriate the Internet to transform 
both  political language and traditionally  instituted political subjectivi- 
ties and the dominant political culture that constitutes  them as unpriv- 
ileged citizens of Turkey in need of pacification. As cyborgs, simians, 
or produsers  living, communicating,  and producing in a digital ecology, 
they know how to evade filtering systems to meet and reach non-Kurds 
in the digital mediascape. They are political. Their daily digital struggle 
is a cultural  and political one that  cannot  be dissociated from histori- 
cal, insurgent  Kurdish  politics which aims for language and education 
rights. Yet, the way they produce the political is radically different from 
 	
their elders or from those involved in traditional forms of political strug- 
gle. They take politics seriously, but  the language they use enjoys the 
possibilities of humor, laughter, and sarcasm. They value political strug- 
gle as an essential part of their subjectivity, but question the call to sac- 
rifice their lives, youth, and love to it. They are also the counterpublic of 
the new pacification regimes that make use of fluid systems to control 
economic, social, and political forces. 
This research also touches on the whys and wherefores of the Gezi 
Revolt of 2013. These nationwide protests were historic, bringing young 
people together with different social classes with different socio-cultural 
and political perspectives, and generating the collective will to end state 
authoritarianism. The authoritarianism that I attempted to outline here 
is enacted on the Kurdish  movement using all the means of technologi- 
cal surveillance and imperial power regimes of the global networks. Mid- 
dle class urbanite  young people are often criticized by their elders as an 
apolitical digital generation. Yet the digital activism of the young Kurds 
demonstrates the ways in which young people can appropriate the social 
media and the streets to produce new means and modes of “the political.” 
As the digital counterpublics of the Kurds  did before them, the Gezi 
protesters  have used the digital mediascape to change Turkey’s political 
landscape to one in which their voices matter  and where they can see, 
hear, and speak with each other across conventional social and identity 
boundaries.  And again, as Kurdish  activists have, The Gezi protesters 
have adopted  the digital mediascape which they inhabit  on daily basis 
to create their own political language and subjectivity, generating joy in 
political action, the humorous power of political discourse, and asserting 
their agency to make their own decisions about their lives, environment, 
and discourses. The Gezi Protests have been momentous precisely in the 
moments  when the protesters  have grown conscious that other  groups 
have been victimized by the authoritarian regime of the state in the same 
way they experienced, including media synopticism and police brutality. 
One such moment was when a twitter user wrote to Bijwenist-Kurd 2.0: 
“I am so ashamed of my own fascist attitude  towards you. I now under- 
stand what you have been through  with this corrupted media.” Another 
wrote “I apologize to you my friends. We have been following the Kurd- 
ish problem through  this media. We’ve been stupid. A big apology” (Çelik, 
2013). In such instances, the “modern Kurdi perspective” that produces and 
is pro- duced by the Kurds’ digital counterpublics reaps its own rewards. 
Much 
	
 	
	
will now depend on how far the counterpublic can be extended, and the 
extent to which it transforms  its members’ identities and language, and 
raises their political consciousness of the sheer possibility of resistance. 
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